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Evolution of trust in the N -player trust game with transformation incentive mechanism

Yuyuan Liu iD, Lichen Wang, Ruqiang Guo, Shijia Hua, Linjie Liu iD, Liang Zhang, The Anh Han iD

Journal of The Royal Society Interface · 2025-03 · 22 (224)

DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2024.0726 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of The Royal Society Interface, online erschienen am 26.03.2025. Verfasst von Yuyuan Liu und 6 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling Shaanxi, People's Republic of China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Trust, Motivation, Game Theory. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 22-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 51 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei in PubMed Central verfügbar. Gefördert von: Natural Science Foundation of Shaanxi Province, National Natural Science Foundation of China.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Trust game is commonly used to study the evolution of trust among unrelated individuals. It offers valuable insights into human interactions in a range of disciplines, including economics, sociology and psychology. Previous research has revealed that reward and punishment systems can effectively promote the evolution of trust. However, these investigations overlook the gaming environment, leaving unresolved the optimal conditions for employing distinct incentives to effectively facilitate trust level. To bridge this gap, we introduce a transformation incentive mechanism in an N -player trust game, where trustees are given different forms of incentives depending on the number of trustees in the group. Using the Markov decision process approach, our research shows that as incentives increase, the level of trust rises continuously, eventually reaching a high level of coexistence between investors and trustworthy trustees. Specifically, in the case of smaller incentives, rewarding trustworthy trustees is more effective. Conversely, in the case of larger incentives, punishing untrustworthy trustees is more effective. Additionally, we find that moderate incentives have a positive impact on increasing the average payoff within the group.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

TrustMotivationGame TheoryHumansReward

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

Markov decision processN-player trust gamedecision-makingtransformation incentive mechanism

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling Shaanxi, People's Republic of China.
  • School of Computing, Engineering and Digital Technologies, Teesside University, Middlesbrough, UK.

ORCID-Profile: Yuyuan Liu, Linjie Liu, The Anh Han

Förderung

  • Natural Science Foundation of Shaanxi Province
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Liu, Y., Wang, L., Guo, R., Hua, S., Liu, L., Zhang, L., & Han, T. A. (2025). Evolution of trust in the N -player trust game with transformation incentive mechanism. Journal of The Royal Society Interface, 22(224). https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2024.0726

Vancouver

Liu Y, Wang L, Guo R, Hua S, Liu L, Zhang L, et al. Evolution of trust in the N -player trust game with transformation incentive mechanism. Journal of The Royal Society Interface. 2025;22(224). doi:10.1098/rsif.2024.0726

BibTeX
@article{Liu2025,
  author = {Liu, Yuyuan and Wang, Lichen and Guo, Ruqiang and Hua, Shijia and Liu, Linjie and Zhang, Liang and Han, The Anh},
  title = {Evolution of trust in the N -player trust game with transformation incentive mechanism},
  journal = {Journal of The Royal Society Interface},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {22},
  number = {224},
  doi = {10.1098/rsif.2024.0726}
}
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