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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Cost Optimisation of Individual-Based Institutional Reward Incentives for Promoting Cooperation in Finite Populations

M H Duong, C M Durbac iD, T A Han

Bulletin of Mathematical Biology · 2024

DOI: 10.1007/s11538-024-01344-7 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 2024. Verfasst von M H Duong und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Mathematics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Reward, Motivation. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 42 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, Royal Society.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In this paper, we study the problem of cost optimisation of individual-based institutional incentives (reward, punishment, and hybrid) for guaranteeing a certain minimal level of cooperative behaviour in a well-mixed, finite population. In this scheme, the individuals in the population interact via cooperation dilemmas (Donation Game or Public Goods Game) in which institutional reward is carried out only if cooperation is not abundant enough (i.e., the number of cooperators is below a threshold $$1\le t\le N-1$$ 1 ≤ t ≤ N - 1 , where N is the population size); and similarly, institutional punishment is carried out only when defection is too abundant. We study analytically the cases $$t=1$$ t = 1 for the reward incentive under the small mutation limit assumption and two different initial states, showing that the cost function is always non-decreasing. We derive the neutral drift and strong selection limits when the intensity of selection tends to zero and infinity, respectively. We numerically investigate the problem for other values of t and for population dynamics with arbitrary mutation rates.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Cooperative BehaviorGame TheoryRewardMotivationMathematical ConceptsPunishmentHumansPopulation DynamicsComputer SimulationPopulation DensityMutation

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

Evolutionary game theoryPopulation dynamics

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Mathematics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK.
  • School of Mathematics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK. cmd639@student.bham.ac.uk.
  • School of Computing, Engineering and Digital Technologies, Teesside University, Middlesbrough, UK.

ORCID-Profile: C M Durbac

Förderung

  • Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
  • Royal Society

Zitieren

APA

Duong, M. H., Durbac, C. M., & Han, T. A. (2024). Cost Optimisation of Individual-Based Institutional Reward Incentives for Promoting Cooperation in Finite Populations. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11538-024-01344-7

Vancouver

Duong MH, Durbac CM, Han TA. Cost Optimisation of Individual-Based Institutional Reward Incentives for Promoting Cooperation in Finite Populations. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology. 2024. doi:10.1007/s11538-024-01344-7

BibTeX
@article{Duong2024,
  author = {Duong, M H and Durbac, C M and Han, T A},
  title = {Cost Optimisation of Individual-Based Institutional Reward Incentives for Promoting Cooperation in Finite Populations},
  journal = {Bulletin of Mathematical Biology},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1007/s11538-024-01344-7}
}
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