Cooperation and coordination in heterogeneous populations
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · 2023
DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0504 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2023. Verfasst von Xiaomin Wang und 7 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Laboratory of Mathematics and Complex Systems, Ministry of Education, School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, Peo…. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 21-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 75 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Max Planck Society, European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
One landmark application of evolutionary game theory is the study of social dilemmas. This literature explores why people cooperate even when there are strong incentives to defect. Much of this literature, however, assumes that interactions are symmetric. Individuals are assumed to have the same strategic options and the same potential pay-offs. Yet many interesting questions arise once individuals are allowed to differ. Here, we study asymmetry in simple coordination games. In our set-up, human participants need to decide how much of their endowment to contribute to a public good. If a group’s collective contribution reaches a pre-defined threshold, all group members receive a reward. To account for possible asymmetries, individuals either differ in their endowments or their productivities. According to a theoretical equilibrium analysis, such games tend to have many possible solutions. In equilibrium, group members may contribute the same amount, different amounts or nothing at all. According to our behavioural experiment, however, humans favour the equilibrium in which everyone contributes the same proportion of their endowment. We use these experimental results to highlight the non-trivial effects of inequality on cooperation, and we discuss to which extent models of evolutionary game theory can account for these effects. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Laboratory of Mathematics and Complex Systems, Ministry of Education, School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, People's Republic of China.
- Max Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön 24306, Germany.
- School of Environment, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, People's Republic of China.
- School of Systems Science, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, People's Republic of China.
ORCID-Profile: Boyu Zhang
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Max Planck Society
- European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program
- National Key Research and Development Program of China
- Beijing Natural Science Foundation
Zitieren
APA
Wang, X., Couto, M. C., Wang, N., An, X., Chen, B., Dong, Y., Hilbe, C., & Zhang, B. (2023). Cooperation and coordination in heterogeneous populations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2021.0504
Vancouver
Wang X, Couto MC, Wang N, An X, Chen B, Dong Y, et al. Cooperation and coordination in heterogeneous populations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. 2023. doi:10.1098/rstb.2021.0504
BibTeX
@article{Wang2023,
author = {Wang, Xiaomin and Couto, Marta C and Wang, Nianyi and An, Xinmiao and Chen, Bin and Dong, Yali and Hilbe, Christian and Zhang, Boyu},
title = {Cooperation and coordination in heterogeneous populations},
journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B},
year = {2023},
doi = {10.1098/rstb.2021.0504}
}
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