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Reporting-triggered institutional incentives promote prosocial behaviors in networked public goods games

Hanmeng Feng iD, Ju Han iD, Xiaojie Chen iD

Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · 2026

DOI: 10.1063/5.0350813 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, 2026. Verfasst von Hanmeng Feng und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Game Theory, Cooperative Behavior, Motivation, Social Behavior. Die Arbeit nennt 56 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The reporting phenomenon is ubiquitous in human society. However, how reporting-triggered institutional incentives influence public cooperation remains theoretically unresolved. Here, we construct a public goods game where individuals adopt one of three strategies: report, cooperate, and defect. In this game, cooperators and reporters contribute a cost to the common pool, whereas defectors make no contribution. Furthermore, each reporter pays a monitoring cost to detect defection and subsequently report it to the institution. Upon receiving a report, the institution will punish defectors and reward reporters with a response probability, irrespective of the number of reporters. We introduce the proposed game into a structured population and analytically derive the average fractions of cooperators, defectors, and reporters in the weak-selection limit by using the coalescing random walk method. We demonstrate that increasing the institutional response probability, reward intensity, or punishment intensity elevates the average fraction of reporters and reduces that of defectors, while keeping the average fraction of cooperators invariant. We further determine the conditions under which reporters are favored by natural selection, reporters are favored over cooperators, and contributors, including cooperators and reporters, prevail, respectively. We find that only when institutional incentives adequately offset the costs of contribution and monitoring can reporters gain an evolutionary advantage and contributors become dominant in the population. Notably, our main results remain robust under a group-dependent implementation rule, where the probability of implementing institutional incentives depends on the number of reporters in the group. Finally, these theoretical predictions are validated by numerical simulations.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Game TheoryCooperative BehaviorMotivationSocial BehaviorHumansReward

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China.

ORCID-Profile: Hanmeng Feng, Ju Han, Xiaojie Chen

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Feng, H., Han, J., & Chen, X. (2026). Reporting-triggered institutional incentives promote prosocial behaviors in networked public goods games. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science. https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0350813

Vancouver

Feng H, Han J, Chen X. Reporting-triggered institutional incentives promote prosocial behaviors in networked public goods games. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science. 2026. doi:10.1063/5.0350813

BibTeX
@article{Feng2026,
  author = {Feng, Hanmeng and Han, Ju and Chen, Xiaojie},
  title = {Reporting-triggered institutional incentives promote prosocial behaviors in networked public goods games},
  journal = {Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1063/5.0350813}
}
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