Why human societies adopt rigid moral rules: The efficiency–robustness trade-off
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 14.07.2026 · 123 (28)
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2535467123 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, online erschienen am 08.07.2026. Verfasst von Julien Lie-Panis und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Morals, Cooperative Behavior. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 84 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR), Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), MIT Schwarzman College of Computing.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Humans are capable of remarkably flexible moral judgment. Yet societies rely on rigid rules—obligations and prohibitions that apply categorically, even when case-by-case reasoning could yield better outcomes. Why would a species capable of flexibility bind itself to rigid rules? We propose that rigid rules arise as social technologies for managing ambiguity about noncooperation. People often have legitimate reasons for failing to cooperate, yet those reasons are typically opaque to observers, allowing opportunists to disguise selfishness as justified hardship. We formalize this idea with a game-theoretic model. Two cooperative equilibria emerge: a flexible norm that accommodates legitimate excuses but is vulnerable to exploitation, and a rigid norm that closes this loophole by mandating cooperation even when inefficient. Comparing these equilibria reveals an efficiency–robustness trade-off: Flexibility maximizes welfare when trust is secure, whereas rigidity preserves cooperation when trust is fragile. This explains why rigid rules prevail in interactions with strangers, formal institutions, or in tight societies, while flexibility is more common when trust is secure.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139.
- Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada.
- Max Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön 24306, Germany.
- Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Institute for Advanced Studies in Toulouse, Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse 31080, France.
- Institut Jean Nicod, Département d'études Cognitives, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Université Paris Sciences & Lettres, Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, CNRS, 75005 Paris, France.
ORCID-Profile: Julien Lie-Panis, Nicolas Baumard, Jean-Baptiste André
Förderung
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR)
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)
- MIT Schwarzman College of Computing
Zitieren
APA
Lie-Panis, J., Fitouchi, L., Baumard, N., & André, J. B. (2026). Why human societies adopt rigid moral rules: The efficiency–robustness trade-off. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 123(28). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2535467123
Vancouver
Lie-Panis J, Fitouchi L, Baumard N, André JB. Why human societies adopt rigid moral rules: The efficiency–robustness trade-off. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2026;123(28). doi:10.1073/pnas.2535467123
BibTeX
@article{LiePanis2026,
author = {Lie-Panis, Julien and Fitouchi, Léo and Baumard, Nicolas and André, Jean-Baptiste},
title = {Why human societies adopt rigid moral rules: The efficiency–robustness trade-off},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
year = {2026},
volume = {123},
number = {28},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.2535467123}
}
EUVIMED