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Coalitions in Repeated Games

S. Nageeb Ali, Ce Liu

Econometrica · 2026 · 94 (6) · 2193-2225

DOI: 10.3982/ecta23921 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Econometrica, 2026. Written by S. Nageeb Ali and 1 co-authors. 53 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0).

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Abstract (original language)

This paper proposes a framework and solution concept for repeated coalitional behavior. We model history‐dependent schemes that use continuation promises and punishments to deter coalitions from blocking. We evaluate the effectiveness of these schemes with and without transferable utility, and apply the framework to study the implications of wage transparency in labor markets.

Cite

APA

Ali, S. N., & Liu, C. (2026). Coalitions in Repeated Games. Econometrica, 94(6), 2193-2225. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23921

Vancouver

Ali SN, Liu C. Coalitions in Repeated Games. Econometrica. 2026;94(6):2193-2225. doi:10.3982/ecta23921

BibTeX
@article{Ali2026,
  author = {Ali, S. Nageeb and Liu, Ce},
  title = {Coalitions in Repeated Games},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {94},
  number = {6},
  pages = {2193--2225},
  doi = {10.3982/ecta23921}
}
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