Repeated games with many players
Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (4) · 1415-1459
DOI: 10.3982/te6787 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Takuo Sugaya und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 59 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Motivated by the problem of sustaining cooperation in large groups with limited information, we analyze the relationship between group size, monitoring precision, and discounting in repeated games with independent, player‐level noise. The viability of cooperation under independent noise is linked to the per‐capita channel capacity of the stage‐game monitoring structure. We show that cooperation is impossible if the per‐capita channel capacity is much smaller than the discount rate. A folk theorem under a novel identification condition provides a near converse. If attention is restricted to co‐linear equilibria (a generalization of strongly symmetric equilibria), cooperation is possible only under much more severe parameter restrictions.
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APA
Sugaya, T., & Wolitzky, A. (2026). Repeated games with many players. Theoretical Economics, 21(4), 1415-1459. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6787
Vancouver
Sugaya T, Wolitzky A. Repeated games with many players. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(4):1415-1459. doi:10.3982/te6787
BibTeX
@article{Sugaya2026,
author = {Sugaya, Takuo and Wolitzky, Alexander},
title = {Repeated games with many players},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {4},
pages = {1415--1459},
doi = {10.3982/te6787}
}
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