EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

A Shapley value for games with expanded coalitions

M. J. Albizuri, M. Cerny, J. M. Zarzuelo

Annals of Operations Research · 2026-05 · 360 (2-3) · 685-701

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-026-07159-0 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Annals of Operations Research, online erschienen am 13.04.2026. Verfasst von M. J. Albizuri und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 19 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Universidad del País Vasco.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Derks and Peters (1993) introduce games with restricted coalitions defined by means of restrictions, which are monotonic projections of the set of players that assign to each coalition a subcoalition. They introduce a Shapley value considering these projections. In our work, we also consider a monotonic projection of the set of players, but instead of taking subcoalitions of coalitions, we take coalitions that contain them. That is, coalitions are expanded. In this way, we model situations in which some players are necessary to make a coalition effective. We give a Shapley value in this framework and obtain two axiomatic characterizations that determine endogenously the projection that expands the coalitions. In the first characterization, we employ a generalization of a monotonicity axiom used by (Young, (1985)) to characterize the Shapley value. In the second one, a dummy player axiom is required, together with additivity. Additionally, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the value introduced by Derks and Peters (1993), employing a suitably adapted dummy player axiom.

Förderung

  • Universidad del País Vasco

Zitieren

APA

Albizuri, M. J., Cerny, M., & Zarzuelo, J. M. (2026). A Shapley value for games with expanded coalitions. Annals of Operations Research, 360(2-3), 685-701. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-026-07159-0

Vancouver

Albizuri MJ, Cerny M, Zarzuelo JM. A Shapley value for games with expanded coalitions. Annals of Operations Research. 2026;360(2-3):685-701. doi:10.1007/s10479-026-07159-0

BibTeX
@article{Albizuri2026,
  author = {Albizuri, M. J. and Cerny, M. and Zarzuelo, J. M.},
  title = {A Shapley value for games with expanded coalitions},
  journal = {Annals of Operations Research},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {360},
  number = {2-3},
  pages = {685--701},
  doi = {10.1007/s10479-026-07159-0}
}
Kostenlos starten →