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Coalitions in Repeated Games

S. Nageeb Ali, Ce Liu

Econometrica · 2026 · 94 (6) · 2193-2225

DOI: 10.3982/ecta23921 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Econometrica, 2026. Verfasst von S. Nageeb Ali und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper proposes a framework and solution concept for repeated coalitional behavior. We model history‐dependent schemes that use continuation promises and punishments to deter coalitions from blocking. We evaluate the effectiveness of these schemes with and without transferable utility, and apply the framework to study the implications of wage transparency in labor markets.

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APA

Ali, S. N., & Liu, C. (2026). Coalitions in Repeated Games. Econometrica, 94(6), 2193-2225. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23921

Vancouver

Ali SN, Liu C. Coalitions in Repeated Games. Econometrica. 2026;94(6):2193-2225. doi:10.3982/ecta23921

BibTeX
@article{Ali2026,
  author = {Ali, S. Nageeb and Liu, Ce},
  title = {Coalitions in Repeated Games},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {94},
  number = {6},
  pages = {2193--2225},
  doi = {10.3982/ecta23921}
}
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