Coalitions in Repeated Games
Econometrica · 2026 · 94 (6) · 2193-2225
DOI: 10.3982/ecta23921 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Econometrica, 2026. Verfasst von S. Nageeb Ali und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper proposes a framework and solution concept for repeated coalitional behavior. We model history‐dependent schemes that use continuation promises and punishments to deter coalitions from blocking. We evaluate the effectiveness of these schemes with and without transferable utility, and apply the framework to study the implications of wage transparency in labor markets.
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APA
Ali, S. N., & Liu, C. (2026). Coalitions in Repeated Games. Econometrica, 94(6), 2193-2225. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23921
Vancouver
Ali SN, Liu C. Coalitions in Repeated Games. Econometrica. 2026;94(6):2193-2225. doi:10.3982/ecta23921
BibTeX
@article{Ali2026,
author = {Ali, S. Nageeb and Liu, Ce},
title = {Coalitions in Repeated Games},
journal = {Econometrica},
year = {2026},
volume = {94},
number = {6},
pages = {2193--2225},
doi = {10.3982/ecta23921}
}
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