EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

INFORMATION DESIGN IN ALLOCATION WITH COSTLY VERIFICATION

Yi‐Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu, Xiangqian Yang

International Economic Review · 2025-08 · 66 (3) · 1267-1285

DOI: 10.1111/iere.12754 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Economic Review, online erschienen am 22.01.2025. Verfasst von Yi‐Chun Chen und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 35 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study information design in a single‐agent allocation problem with costly verification, where the principal has a positive reservation value. The agent learns privately a signal about the principal's allocation value, drawn from a distribution controlled by an information designer. Given the signal distribution, the principal designs a mechanism to maximize her net value. We show that the agent‐optimal information pools high values at a signal just worth verification, whereas the principal‐optimal information features full disclosure. Moreover, any agent‐optimal information is principal‐worst, despite their partially aligned interests and the absence of transfers.

Zitieren

APA

Chen, Y., Hu, G., & Yang, X. (2025). INFORMATION DESIGN IN ALLOCATION WITH COSTLY VERIFICATION. International Economic Review, 66(3), 1267-1285. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12754

Vancouver

Chen Y, Hu G, Yang X. INFORMATION DESIGN IN ALLOCATION WITH COSTLY VERIFICATION. International Economic Review. 2025;66(3):1267-1285. doi:10.1111/iere.12754

BibTeX
@article{Chen2025,
  author = {Chen, Yi‐Chun and Hu, Gaoji and Yang, Xiangqian},
  title = {INFORMATION DESIGN IN ALLOCATION WITH COSTLY VERIFICATION},
  journal = {International Economic Review},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {66},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1267--1285},
  doi = {10.1111/iere.12754}
}
Kostenlos starten →