Probabilistic verification in mechanism design
Theoretical Economics · 2025 · 20 (4) · 1247-1284
DOI: 10.3982/te6266 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2025. Verfasst von Ian Ball und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 9-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 52 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each test. We characterize whether each type has an associated test that best screens out all other types. If this condition holds, then the testing technology can be represented in a tractable reduced form. We use this reduced form to solve for profit‐maximizing mechanisms with verification. As the verification technology varies, the solution continuously interpolates between the no‐verification solution and full surplus extraction.
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APA
Ball, I., & Kattwinkel, D. (2025). Probabilistic verification in mechanism design. Theoretical Economics, 20(4), 1247-1284. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6266
Vancouver
Ball I, Kattwinkel D. Probabilistic verification in mechanism design. Theoretical Economics. 2025;20(4):1247-1284. doi:10.3982/te6266
BibTeX
@article{Ball2025,
author = {Ball, Ian and Kattwinkel, Deniz},
title = {Probabilistic verification in mechanism design},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2025},
volume = {20},
number = {4},
pages = {1247--1284},
doi = {10.3982/te6266}
}
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