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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Evolution of cooperation in psychological games with costly information

Yuan Liu iD, Shuyang Shao iD, Yakun Wang iD, Bin Wu iD

Journal of the Royal Society Interface · 10.06.2026 · 23 (239)

DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2025.1172 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the Royal Society Interface, online erschienen am 10.06.2026. Verfasst von Yuan Liu und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications , Beijing, People's Republic of China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Biological Evolution. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 55 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), BUPT Excellent Ph.D. Students Foundation, China Scholarship Council.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Cooperation is crucial for both biological and social systems. Yet it is not straightforward from the evolutionary perspective, since individuals are tempted to defect for personal interests. In traditional models, it is usually assumed that cooperation is determined only by external behaviours. Individuals, however, are likely to pay extra psychological costs if what they do differs from what they think, and are likely to pay to know what others think. Motivated by these observations, we extend donation games to psychological games by introducing value-behaviour inconsistency, which creates psychological costs such as guiltiness or regret, and information costs, which individuals pay to know the opponent’s values. We find that the key for cooperation under weak rationality is the large guiltiness (the psychological cost for an individual with defective behaviour and cooperative internal value); the heterogeneity of information costs governs how cooperation is further enhanced under moderate rationality; and moderate information costs can effectively favour cooperation under strong rationality, which is typically absent in classical donation games. These findings highlight how guiltiness, regret and information costs together shape cooperative behaviour across the rationality intensity. Our work can be insightful for a novel paradigm of cooperation beyond the classical prisoner’s dilemma.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Cooperative BehaviorGame TheoryBiological EvolutionHumansPrisoner Dilemma

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

cooperationcostly informationevolutionary gamespsychological games

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications , Beijing, People's Republic of China.
  • Key Laboratory of Mathematics and Information Networks (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications), Ministry of Education, Beijing, People's Republic of China.
  • Department of Theoretical Biology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany.

ORCID-Profile: Yuan Liu, Shuyang Shao, Yakun Wang, Bin Wu

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC)
  • BUPT Excellent Ph.D. Students Foundation
  • China Scholarship Council
  • Programme for Promoting the Development of Mathematics (2025) from the School of Mathematical Sciences, BUPT

Zitieren

APA

Liu, Y., Shao, S., Wang, Y., & Wu, B. (2026). Evolution of cooperation in psychological games with costly information. Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 23(239). https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2025.1172

Vancouver

Liu Y, Shao S, Wang Y, Wu B. Evolution of cooperation in psychological games with costly information. Journal of the Royal Society Interface. 2026;23(239). doi:10.1098/rsif.2025.1172

BibTeX
@article{Liu2026,
  author = {Liu, Yuan and Shao, Shuyang and Wang, Yakun and Wu, Bin},
  title = {Evolution of cooperation in psychological games with costly information},
  journal = {Journal of the Royal Society Interface},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {23},
  number = {239},
  doi = {10.1098/rsif.2025.1172}
}
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