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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Optimal auction design with contingent payments and costly verification

Ian Ball, Teemu Pekkarinen

Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (4) · 1189-1221

DOI: 10.3982/te6485 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Ian Ball und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 41 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study the design of an auction for an income‐generating asset such as an intellectual property license. Each bidder has a signal about his future income from acquiring the asset. After the asset is allocated, the winner's income from the asset is realized privately. The principal can audit the winner, at a cost, and then charge a payment contingent on the winner's realized income. We solve for an auction that maximizes the principal's revenue, net of auditing costs. The winning bidder is charged linear royalties up to a cap, beyond which there is no auditing. A higher bidder pays more in cash upfront and faces a lower royalty cap.

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APA

Ball, I., & Pekkarinen, T. (2026). Optimal auction design with contingent payments and costly verification. Theoretical Economics, 21(4), 1189-1221. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6485

Vancouver

Ball I, Pekkarinen T. Optimal auction design with contingent payments and costly verification. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(4):1189-1221. doi:10.3982/te6485

BibTeX
@article{Ball2026,
  author = {Ball, Ian and Pekkarinen, Teemu},
  title = {Optimal auction design with contingent payments and costly verification},
  journal = {Theoretical Economics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {21},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1189--1221},
  doi = {10.3982/te6485}
}
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