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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Score-mediated mutual consent and indirect reciprocity

Marcus Frean iD, Stephen Marsland iD

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 2023

DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2302107120 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2023. Verfasst von Marcus Frean und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Engineering and Computer Science, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington 6012, New Zealand. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior, Lymphatic System. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 35 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: Te Punaha Matatini.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Helping strangers at a cost to oneself is a hallmark of many human interactions, but difficult to justify from the viewpoint of natural selection, particularly in anonymous one-shot interactions. Reputational scoring can provide the necessary motivation via “indirect reciprocity,” but maintaining reliable scores requires close oversight to prevent cheating. We show that in the absence of such supervision, it is possible that scores might be managed by mutual consent between the agents themselves instead of by third parties. The space of possible strategies for such “consented” score changes is very large but, using a simple cooperation game, we search it, asking what kinds of agreement can i) invade a population from rare and ii) resist invasion once common. We prove mathematically and demonstrate computationally that score mediation by mutual consent does enable cooperation without oversight. Moreover, the most invasive and stable strategies belong to one family and ground the concept of value by incrementing one score at the cost of the other, thus closely resembling the token exchange that underlies money in everyday human transactions. The most successful strategy has the flavor of money except that agents without money can generate new score if they meet. This strategy is evolutionarily stable, and has higher fitness, but is not physically realizable in a decentralized way; when conservation of score is enforced more money-like strategies dominate. The equilibrium distribution of scores under any of this family of strategies is geometric, meaning that agents with score 0 are inherent to money-like strategies.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Cooperative BehaviorLymphatic SystemHumansMotivationSelection, GeneticInformed ConsentGame TheoryBiological Evolution

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

cooperationevolutionary game theoryindirect reciprocity

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Engineering and Computer Science, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington 6012, New Zealand.
  • School of Mathematics and Statistics, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington 6012, New Zealand.

ORCID-Profile: Marcus Frean, Stephen Marsland

Förderung

  • Te Punaha Matatini

Zitieren

APA

Frean, M., & Marsland, S. (2023). Score-mediated mutual consent and indirect reciprocity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2302107120

Vancouver

Frean M, Marsland S. Score-mediated mutual consent and indirect reciprocity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2023. doi:10.1073/pnas.2302107120

BibTeX
@article{Frean2023,
  author = {Frean, Marcus and Marsland, Stephen},
  title = {Score-mediated mutual consent and indirect reciprocity},
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.2302107120}
}
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