Voting and Trading on Public Information
The Review of Financial Studies · 13.04.2026
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhag035 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 13.04.2026. Verfasst von Markus Parlasca und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 64 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper studies how public information, such as proxy advice, affects shareholder voting and, thus, corporate decision-making. We find that while public information improves the voting decisions of uninformed shareholders, it also induces privately informed shareholders to exit rather than to exercise their voice (vote). As a result, public information impairs information aggregation by voting but improves information aggregation by trading. Overall, public information can undermine corporate decision-making. Furthermore, slightly more precise public information can lead to a discontinuous reduction in firm value. Our results give rise to new empirical predictions and have implications for regulation.
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APA
Parlasca, M., & Voss, P. (2026). Voting and Trading on Public Information. The Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhag035
Vancouver
Parlasca M, Voss P. Voting and Trading on Public Information. The Review of Financial Studies. 2026. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhag035
BibTeX
@article{Parlasca2026,
author = {Parlasca, Markus and Voss, Paul},
title = {Voting and Trading on Public Information},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhag035}
}
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