Voting on Public Goods: Citizens vs Shareholders
The Review of Financial Studies · 05.06.2026
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhag051 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 05.06.2026. Verfasst von Robin Döttling und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 96 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the interplay between a “one person-one vote” political system and a “one share-one vote” corporate governance regime. If shareholders push firms for more prosocial policies, political backlash may arise, undoing these initiatives. If public policy is frictionless, shareholder democracy becomes irrelevant: the political system fully offsets shareholder influence. With public policy frictions, prosocial corporations can mitigate regulatory shortcomings and enhance corporate public goods provision. Nevertheless, shareholder democracy can hurt citizens due to the representation problem: it favors the preferences of the wealthy. Investor diversification, pass-through voting, and corporate greenwashing have important implications for these trade-offs of shareholder democracy.
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APA
Döttling, R., Levit, D., Malenko, N., & Rola-Janicka, M. (2026). Voting on Public Goods: Citizens vs Shareholders. The Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhag051
Vancouver
Döttling R, Levit D, Malenko N, Rola-Janicka M. Voting on Public Goods: Citizens vs Shareholders. The Review of Financial Studies. 2026. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhag051
BibTeX
@article{Dttling2026,
author = {Döttling, Robin and Levit, Doron and Malenko, Nadya and Rola-Janicka, Magdalena},
title = {Voting on Public Goods: Citizens vs Shareholders},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhag051}
}
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