Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation
Journal of the European Economic Association · 02.12.2024 · 22 (6) · 2598-2647
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvae035 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the European Economic Association, online erschienen am 27.04.2024. Verfasst von Laurent Bouton und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines the comparative properties of voting rules based on the richness of their ballot spaces, assuming a given distribution of voting rights. We focus on how well voting rules aggregate the information dispersed among voters. We consider how different voting rules affect both voters’ decisions at the voting stage and the incentives of the agenda-setter, who decides whether to put the proposal to a vote. Without agenda-setter, the voting efficiency of rules is higher when their ballot space is richer. Moreover, full-information efficiency requires full divisibility of the votes. In the presence of an agenda-setter, we uncover a novel trade-off: in some cases, rules with high voting efficiency provide worse incentives to the agenda-setter to select good proposals. This negative effect can be large enough to wash out the higher voting efficiency of even the most efficient rules.
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APA
Bouton, L., Llorente-Saguer, A., Macé, A., & Xefteris, D. (2024). Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation. Journal of the European Economic Association, 22(6), 2598-2647. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae035
Vancouver
Bouton L, Llorente-Saguer A, Macé A, Xefteris D. Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2024;22(6):2598-2647. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvae035
BibTeX
@article{Bouton2024,
author = {Bouton, Laurent and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol and Macé, Antonin and Xefteris, Dimitrios},
title = {Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation},
journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
year = {2024},
volume = {22},
number = {6},
pages = {2598--2647},
doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvae035}
}
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