Trading ahead of barbarians’ arrival at the gate: insider trading on noninside information
Review of Finance · 01.05.2026 · 30 (3) · 921-948
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfaf065 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 05.11.2025. Verfasst von Georgy Chabakauri und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 35 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Privately informed about firm fundamentals, corporate insiders detect activism-motivated trades better than other traders. This article solves the model of this novel form of insider trading motivated by noninsider information and presents empirical evidence. Corporate insiders preserve their ownership (restraining from selling or buying more) before activist interventions go public to benefit from price appreciation and to defend their private benefits of control. Surveillance technology facilitates response to predisclosure activist trading, especially when positive information about firm fundamentals is absent, supporting the mechanism that insiders attribute order flows to activist interest when speculation on fundamentals can be ruled out.
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APA
Chabakauri, G., Fos, V., & Jiang, W. (2026). Trading ahead of barbarians’ arrival at the gate: insider trading on noninside information. Review of Finance, 30(3), 921-948. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfaf065
Vancouver
Chabakauri G, Fos V, Jiang W. Trading ahead of barbarians’ arrival at the gate: insider trading on noninside information. Review of Finance. 2026;30(3):921-948. doi:10.1093/rof/rfaf065
BibTeX
@article{Chabakauri2026,
author = {Chabakauri, Georgy and Fos, Vyacheslav and Jiang, Wei},
title = {Trading ahead of barbarians’ arrival at the gate: insider trading on noninside information},
journal = {Review of Finance},
year = {2026},
volume = {30},
number = {3},
pages = {921--948},
doi = {10.1093/rof/rfaf065}
}
EUVIMED