A Function-Based Account of Fittingness
Philosophers' Imprint · 05.11.2026 · 26
DOI: 10.3998/phimp.8494 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophers' Imprint, online erschienen am 05.11.2026. Verfasst von Andrew T. Forcehimes. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 86 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Can we offer a constitutive account of fittingness? Offering such an account has proven difficult because of the great diversity of fit-assessable responses—e.g., believing, desiring, fearing, blaming, apologizing, thanking, and laughing. Yet, when surveying such examples of fit-apt responses, what's striking is that invariably each response-type has a job, a goal, an end, a telos. Believing, desiring, fearing, blaming, apologizing, thanking, and laughing are all plausible candidates for having proper functions. The account I aim to defend runs with this idea. Put roughly, fittingness is the relation that holds between a response and its object just when and because the object has the properties that an object of that response needs to possess for the response to non-deviantly fulfill its function.
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APA
Forcehimes, A. T. (2026). A Function-Based Account of Fittingness. Philosophers' Imprint, 26(0). https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.8494
Vancouver
Forcehimes AT. A Function-Based Account of Fittingness. Philosophers' Imprint. 2026;26(0). doi:10.3998/phimp.8494
BibTeX
@article{Forcehimes2026,
author = {Forcehimes, Andrew T.},
title = {A Function-Based Account of Fittingness},
journal = {Philosophers' Imprint},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
number = {0},
doi = {10.3998/phimp.8494}
}
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