What Makes Gentrification Wrong? A Place-based Account
Journal of Moral Philosophy · 11.03.2024 · 21 (5-6) · 625-653
DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20244083 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Moral Philosophy, erschienen am 11.03.2024. Verfasst von Meena Krishnamurthy und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 12-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Through an analysis of the moral relationship between people and place, this paper offers a new view of the wrongful character of gentrification, which is pluralistic, locating the wrong in the non-fulfillment of three place-related rights: rights to a home, rights of residency, and place-based rights to a community. By focusing on the multiple ways that people are connected to place, we offer a more complete and systematic account of place-related rights that is not only able to make sense of people’s lived experiences of the harms of gentrification but is also able to address standard criticisms, which have been made of other key accounts of the wrong of gentrification.
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APA
Krishnamurthy, M., & Moore, M. (2024). What Makes Gentrification Wrong? A Place-based Account. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 21(5-6), 625-653. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20244083
Vancouver
Krishnamurthy M, Moore M. What Makes Gentrification Wrong? A Place-based Account. Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2024;21(5-6):625-653. doi:10.1163/17455243-20244083
BibTeX
@article{Krishnamurthy2024,
author = {Krishnamurthy, Meena and Moore, Margaret},
title = {What Makes Gentrification Wrong? A Place-based Account},
journal = {Journal of Moral Philosophy},
year = {2024},
volume = {21},
number = {5-6},
pages = {625--653},
doi = {10.1163/17455243-20244083}
}
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