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Attitudes and the Normativity of Fittingness

Conor McHugh

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · 04.06.2023 · 97 (1) · 273-293

DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akad011 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, online erschienen am 04.06.2023. Verfasst von Conor McHugh. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

What is the structure of normative reality? According to X First, normativity has a monistic foundationalist structure: there is a unique normatively basic property in terms of which all the other normative properties are analysed. The main aim of this paper is to defend the view that fittingness—the property that an attitude has when it gets things right with respect to its object, as when you admire the admirable or desire the desirable—is first, or perhaps joint first. I will focus in particular on the questions whether and why fittingness is normative.

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APA

McHugh, C. (2023). Attitudes and the Normativity of Fittingness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 97(1), 273-293. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akad011

Vancouver

McHugh C. Attitudes and the Normativity of Fittingness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. 2023;97(1):273-293. doi:10.1093/arisup/akad011

BibTeX
@article{McHugh2023,
  author = {McHugh, Conor},
  title = {Attitudes and the Normativity of Fittingness},
  journal = {Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {97},
  number = {1},
  pages = {273--293},
  doi = {10.1093/arisup/akad011}
}
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