EUVIMEDSkopri EUVIMED
Open access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

The Copernican Argument for Alien Consciousness; The Mimicry Argument Against Robot Consciousness

Eric Schwitzgebel, Jeremy Pober

Philosophers' Imprint · 2026-07-01 · 26

DOI: 10.3998/phimp.7823 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Philosophers' Imprint, published online on 2026-07-01. Written by Eric Schwitzgebel and 1 co-authors. Cited 1 times so far (Crossref); 57 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AstrattDettalji biblijografiċiCiteRelated studies

Abstract (original language)

On broadly Copernican grounds, we are entitled to assume that apparently behaviorally sophisticated extraterrestrial entities ("aliens") would be conscious. Otherwise, we humans would be inexplicably, implausibly lucky to have consciousness, while similarly behaviorally sophisticated entities elsewhere would be mere shells, devoid of consciousness. However, this Copernican default assumption is canceled in the case of behaviorally sophisticated entities designed to mimic superficial features associated with consciousness ("consciousness mimics"), and in particular a broad class of current, near-future, and hypothetical robots. These considerations, which we formulate, respectively, as the Copernican and Mimicry Arguments, jointly defeat an otherwise potentially attractive parity principle, according to which we should apply the same types of behavioral or cognitive tests to aliens and robots, attributing or denying consciousness similarly to the extent they perform similarly. Instead of grounding speculations about alien and robot consciousness in metaphysical or scientific theories about the physical or functional bases of consciousness, our approach appeals directly to the epistemic principles of Copernican mediocrity and inference to the best explanation. This permits us to justify default assumptions about consciousness while remaining to a substantial extent neutral about specific metaphysical and scientific theories.

Cite

APA

Schwitzgebel, E., & Pober, J. (2026). The Copernican Argument for Alien Consciousness; The Mimicry Argument Against Robot Consciousness. Philosophers' Imprint, 26(0). https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.7823

Vancouver

Schwitzgebel E, Pober J. The Copernican Argument for Alien Consciousness; The Mimicry Argument Against Robot Consciousness. Philosophers' Imprint. 2026;26(0). doi:10.3998/phimp.7823

BibTeX
@article{Schwitzgebel2026,
  author = {Schwitzgebel, Eric and Pober, Jeremy},
  title = {The Copernican Argument for Alien Consciousness; The Mimicry Argument Against Robot Consciousness},
  journal = {Philosophers' Imprint},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {26},
  number = {0},
  doi = {10.3998/phimp.7823}
}
Start for free →