The Case Against Organoid Consciousness
Neuroethics · 2024-04 · 17 (1)
DOI: 10.1007/s12152-024-09548-3 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Neuroethics, online erschienen am 14.03.2024. Verfasst von James Croxford und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 22-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 118 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Monash University.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Neural organoids are laboratory-generated entities that replicate certain structural and functional features of the human brain. Most neural organoids are disembodied—completely decoupled from sensory input and motor output. As such, questions about their potential capacity for consciousness are exceptionally difficult to answer. While not disputing the need for caution regarding certain neural organoid types, this paper appeals to two broad constraints on any adequate theory of consciousness—the first involving the dependence of consciousness on embodiment; the second involving the dependence of consciousness on representations—to argue that disembodied neural organoids are not plausible candidates for consciousness.
Förderung
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research
- Monash University
Zitieren
APA
Croxford, J., & Bayne, T. (2024). The Case Against Organoid Consciousness. Neuroethics, 17(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09548-3
Vancouver
Croxford J, Bayne T. The Case Against Organoid Consciousness. Neuroethics. 2024;17(1). doi:10.1007/s12152-024-09548-3
BibTeX
@article{Croxford2024,
author = {Croxford, James and Bayne, Tim},
title = {The Case Against Organoid Consciousness},
journal = {Neuroethics},
year = {2024},
volume = {17},
number = {1},
doi = {10.1007/s12152-024-09548-3}
}
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