The Condorcet Jury Theorem Under Ambiguity
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · 22.06.2026 · 13
DOI: 10.3998/ergo.9868 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 22.06.2026. Verfasst von Bele Wollesen. Die Arbeit nennt 45 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper evaluates the Condorcet Jury Theorem in the context of ambiguity. It explores the effects on the assumption of voter competence when voters face situations in which they can no longer ascribe a single probability. In contrast to voting in situations where voters are able to assign such probabilities, this paper demonstrates that voters may fail to vote competently under ambiguity, even if they are honest, practically rational, and epistemically competent. Thus, the conditions under which voter competence can be guaranteed become unclear once we adopt a less idealised framework of uncertainty. Specifically, conditions that ensure voter competence under risk do not necessarily guarantee voter competence under ambiguity. The second contribution is a more positive one. It outlines a fruitful research agenda aimed at identifying collective decision procedures that are better suited to less idealised uncertainty frameworks. In this regard, the paper shows how allowing abstention can have positive effects on the epistemic benefits of voting and extends the Condorcet Jury Theorem accordingly.
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APA
Wollesen, B. (2026). The Condorcet Jury Theorem Under Ambiguity. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 13(0). https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.9868
Vancouver
Wollesen B. The Condorcet Jury Theorem Under Ambiguity. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. 2026;13(0). doi:10.3998/ergo.9868
BibTeX
@article{Wollesen2026,
author = {Wollesen, Bele},
title = {The Condorcet Jury Theorem Under Ambiguity},
journal = {Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
volume = {13},
number = {0},
doi = {10.3998/ergo.9868}
}
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