Bias and Sensitivity under Ambiguity
American Economic Review · 01.12.2024 · 114 (12) · 4091-4133
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20231012 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.12.2024. Verfasst von Zhen Huo und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 11-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 74 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper characterizes the effects of ambiguity aversion under dispersed information. The equilibrium outcome is observationally equivalent to a Bayesian forecast of the fundamental with increased sensitivity to signals and a pessimistic bias. This equivalence result takes a simple form that accommodates dynamic information and strategic interactions. Applying the result, we show that ambiguity aversion helps rationalize the joint empirical pattern between the bias and persistence of inflation forecasts conditional on household income. In a policy game à la Barro and Gordon (1983) with ambiguity-averse agents, the policy rule features higher average inflation and increased responsiveness to fundamentals. (JEL D81, D83, E31, E37, E71)
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APA
Huo, Z., Pedroni, M., & Pei, G. (2024). Bias and Sensitivity under Ambiguity. American Economic Review, 114(12), 4091-4133. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20231012
Vancouver
Huo Z, Pedroni M, Pei G. Bias and Sensitivity under Ambiguity. American Economic Review. 2024;114(12):4091-4133. doi:10.1257/aer.20231012
BibTeX
@article{Huo2024,
author = {Huo, Zhen and Pedroni, Marcelo and Pei, Guangyu},
title = {Bias and Sensitivity under Ambiguity},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2024},
volume = {114},
number = {12},
pages = {4091--4133},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20231012}
}
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