CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS
International Economic Review · 2025-02 · 66 (1) · 313-329
DOI: 10.1111/iere.12728 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Economic Review, online erschienen am 16.08.2024. Verfasst von Salvador Barberà und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 21 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, the single‐peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains.
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APA
Barberà, S., Berga, D., Moreno, B., & Nicolò, A. (2025). CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS. International Economic Review, 66(1), 313-329. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12728
Vancouver
Barberà S, Berga D, Moreno B, Nicolò A. CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS. International Economic Review. 2025;66(1):313-329. doi:10.1111/iere.12728
BibTeX
@article{Barber2025,
author = {Barberà, Salvador and Berga, Dolors and Moreno, Bernardo and Nicolò, Antonio},
title = {CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS},
journal = {International Economic Review},
year = {2025},
volume = {66},
number = {1},
pages = {313--329},
doi = {10.1111/iere.12728}
}
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