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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS

Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Antonio Nicolò

International Economic Review · 2025-02 · 66 (1) · 313-329

DOI: 10.1111/iere.12728 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Economic Review, online erschienen am 16.08.2024. Verfasst von Salvador Barberà und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 21 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, the single‐peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains.

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APA

Barberà, S., Berga, D., Moreno, B., & Nicolò, A. (2025). CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS. International Economic Review, 66(1), 313-329. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12728

Vancouver

Barberà S, Berga D, Moreno B, Nicolò A. CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS. International Economic Review. 2025;66(1):313-329. doi:10.1111/iere.12728

BibTeX
@article{Barber2025,
  author = {Barberà, Salvador and Berga, Dolors and Moreno, Bernardo and Nicolò, Antonio},
  title = {CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS},
  journal = {International Economic Review},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {66},
  number = {1},
  pages = {313--329},
  doi = {10.1111/iere.12728}
}
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