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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Research on the Carbon Credit Exchange Strategy for Scrap Vehicles Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Quan Wu, Wei Cheng, Zuoxiong Zheng, Guangjun Zhang, Haicheng Xiao, Chuan Wen

International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health · 2023

DOI: 10.3390/ijerph20032686 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 2023. Verfasst von Quan Wu und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Faculty of Transportation Engineering, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650500, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Game Theory, Government. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 55 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Kunming University of Science and Technology Extracurricular Academic Science and Technology Innovation Fund.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In this article, we construct a game model that uses government regulators and scrap vehicle owners as the main parties to investigate the carbon credit exchange strategy of scrap vehicles using evolutionary game theory. The results were validated using Matlab simulation analysis to reveal the dynamic evolution process of the strategy of both sides of the game. A sensitivity analysis of the key parameters was conducted to explore the influence of each parameter on the evolution process and the stabilization trends. The study shows that (1) The time for the game system to reach a steady state is inversely related to the size of the initial willingness of the parties to cooperate. (2) In the mixed steady-state scenario, when the overall return differential between the positive and negative regulatory verification by government departments is positive, the steady state is participation and positive scrapping. (3) When the probability of the government verifying and being successful in verifying the punishment of the owner’s negative scrapping behavior increases, both parties of the game will eventually choose the strategy of participation and positive scrapping. When the cost of the government participation strategy and the cost of the government verification strategy increase, both sides of the game will eventually choose the strategy combination of no participation and positive scrapping. (4) When the owner’s reward for cooperating with the strategy, the owner’s cost of scrapping the vehicle, and the benefits of the owner’s negative cooperation strategy change, they will not change the strategy stability results but will affect the time it takes for the game system to reach a stable state. This study has theoretical implications for government policies in the scrapping industry and how to guide vehicle owners to actively scrap their vehicles.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Game TheoryGovernmentComputer SimulationGovernment Agencies

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

carbon creditsevolutionary game theoryscrap vehiclestransportation industry

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Faculty of Transportation Engineering, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650500, China.
  • Yunnan Engineering Survey and Design Institute Group Co., Ltd., Kunming 650500, China.
  • Faculty of Architecture, Civil and Transportation Engineering, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China.

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Kunming University of Science and Technology Extracurricular Academic Science and Technology Innovation Fund

Zitieren

APA

Wu, Q., Cheng, W., Zheng, Z., Zhang, G., Xiao, H., & Wen, C. (2023). Research on the Carbon Credit Exchange Strategy for Scrap Vehicles Based on Evolutionary Game Theory. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20032686

Vancouver

Wu Q, Cheng W, Zheng Z, Zhang G, Xiao H, Wen C. Research on the Carbon Credit Exchange Strategy for Scrap Vehicles Based on Evolutionary Game Theory. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2023. doi:10.3390/ijerph20032686

BibTeX
@article{Wu2023,
  author = {Wu, Quan and Cheng, Wei and Zheng, Zuoxiong and Zhang, Guangjun and Xiao, Haicheng and Wen, Chuan},
  title = {Research on the Carbon Credit Exchange Strategy for Scrap Vehicles Based on Evolutionary Game Theory},
  journal = {International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.3390/ijerph20032686}
}
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