EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Government regulation strategy, leading firms’ innovation strategy, and following firms imitation strategy: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory

Mengke Zhang, Yan Huang iD, Yifan Jin, Yuan Bao

PLOS ONE · 08.06.2023 · 18 (6) · e0286730

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0286730 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS ONE, online erschienen am 08.06.2023. Verfasst von Mengke Zhang und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Management, Beijing Union University, Beijing, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Ecosystem, Game Theory. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 17-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 95 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Beijing Social Science Foundation of China, National Social Science Fund of China.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In the innovation ecosystem, the knowledge-based game behavior of each subject not only pertains to its own survival and development but also affects evolution of the innovation ecosystem. The present study investigates the choice of government’s regulation strategy, leading firms’ innovation protection strategy and following firms’ imitation strategy from the perspective of group evolutionary game. Based on the cost-benefit perspective, an asymmetric tripartite evolutionary game model and a simulation model are constructed to analyze the strategies and stability of the evolutionary equilibrium of each subject. We focus mainly on the protection intensity of innovation achievements by leading enterprises and the difficulty of imitation and substitution by following enterprises. The cost of patent operation and maintenance, government subsidies, and the relative difficulty of technology substitution and imitation were identified as the key factors affecting the evolutionary equilibrium of the system. Based on different scenarios resulting from the aforementioned factors, four equilibrium states are observed in the system, namely {no government regulation, technology secrecy, substitution}, {no government regulation, technology secrecy, imitation}, {no government regulation, patent application, imitation}, and {government regulation, patent application, imitation}. Finally, the study suggests corresponding recommendations for the three parties, which can help governments as well as the leading and following firms to choose appropriate behavioral strategies. At the same time, this study offers positive insights to participants in the global innovation ecosystem.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

EcosystemGame TheoryHumansImitative BehaviorComputer SimulationGovernmentChina

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Management, Beijing Union University, Beijing, China.

ORCID-Profile: Yan Huang

Förderung

  • Beijing Social Science Foundation of China
  • National Social Science Fund of China

Zitieren

APA

Zhang, M., Huang, Y., Jin, Y., & Bao, Y. (2023). Government regulation strategy, leading firms’ innovation strategy, and following firms imitation strategy: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory. PLOS ONE, 18(6), e0286730. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0286730

Vancouver

Zhang M, Huang Y, Jin Y, Bao Y. Government regulation strategy, leading firms’ innovation strategy, and following firms imitation strategy: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory. PLOS ONE. 2023;18(6):e0286730. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0286730

BibTeX
@article{Zhang2023,
  author = {Zhang, Mengke and Huang, Yan and Jin, Yifan and Bao, Yuan},
  title = {Government regulation strategy, leading firms’ innovation strategy, and following firms imitation strategy: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory},
  journal = {PLOS ONE},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {18},
  number = {6},
  pages = {e0286730},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0286730}
}
Kostenlos starten →