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Game analysis on PPP model operation of abandoned mines ecological restoration under the innovation of central government’s reward and punishment system in China

Dongmei Feng, Liang Wang iD, Xiumei Duan

PLOS ONE · 29.05.2024 · 19 (5) · e0304368

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0304368 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS ONE, online erschienen am 29.05.2024. Verfasst von Dongmei Feng und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Business Administration, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Punishment. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

There is a huge funding gap in the abandoned mines ecological restoration in China. It is of great research value to explore how PPP model can better introduce social capital into the low-profit ecological restoration of abandoned mines. Based on the innovation perspective of the central government’s reward and punishment system, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of "local government-social capital", analyzes the interaction and behavior mechanism of core stakeholders in the operation process of abandoned mines ecological restoration PPP mode, and discusses the influence of evolutionary equilibrium strategy and parameters change on evolutionary strategy under different scenarios by Matlab simulation. The research shows that the abandoned mines ecological restoration needs the support of the central government. When the local government lightly punishes the low-quality service of social capital, the central government needs to pay higher costs to promote all parties to actively participate in the operation and supervision of the PPP project. The revenue and cost of government supervision, the operating subsidy for social capital and the cost saved by social capital in providing bad service are the key factors affecting the evolution of the game between government and social capital. Punishment can effectively spur social capital to keep the contract and operate in the project, but the punishment effect will be ineffective without government supervision. Finally, some suggestions are put forward, such as establishing a long-term supervision mechanism and a reasonable income mechanism for PPP projects, increasing penalties for violations, attracting third parties to reduce supervision costs and strengthening communication between the two parties, so as to make the project take into account the economic performance of social capital and the social welfare of government departments, and achieve dual Pareto improvement.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

PunishmentChinaMiningRewardGame TheoryHumansEnvironmental Restoration and RemediationGovernmentConservation of Natural ResourcesSocial Capital

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Business Administration, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao, China.
  • College of Chemistry and Environment Engineering & Center of Instrument Analysis, YingKou Institute of Technology, Yingkou, China.

ORCID-Profile: Liang Wang

Zitieren

APA

Feng, D., Wang, L., & Duan, X. (2024). Game analysis on PPP model operation of abandoned mines ecological restoration under the innovation of central government’s reward and punishment system in China. PLOS ONE, 19(5), e0304368. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0304368

Vancouver

Feng D, Wang L, Duan X. Game analysis on PPP model operation of abandoned mines ecological restoration under the innovation of central government’s reward and punishment system in China. PLOS ONE. 2024;19(5):e0304368. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0304368

BibTeX
@article{Feng2024,
  author = {Feng, Dongmei and Wang, Liang and Duan, Xiumei},
  title = {Game analysis on PPP model operation of abandoned mines ecological restoration under the innovation of central government’s reward and punishment system in China},
  journal = {PLOS ONE},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {19},
  number = {5},
  pages = {e0304368},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0304368}
}
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