Quality Investments and Costly Adoption
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics · 27.05.2026 · 26 (1) · 81-110
DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2025-0113 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, online erschienen am 14.04.2026. Verfasst von Roberto Rozzi und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 39 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Joachim Herz Foundation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In many markets, consumers incur adoption costs when switching from a low-quality good to a high-quality good. We analyze under which circumstances the competing firm has an incentive to invest in high quality. We investigate two scenarios: (i) homogeneous and (ii) heterogeneous adoption costs. If adoption costs are homogeneous, the competing firm produces high-quality goods for sufficiently low adoption costs, and an increase in adoption costs reduces the range of values for which the competing firm invests in high quality. In contrast, if adoption costs are heterogeneous, the competing firm produces high-quality goods for sufficiently high adoption cost heterogeneity, and an increase in average adoption costs expands the range of values for which the competing firm invests in high quality.
Förderung
- Joachim Herz Foundation
Zitieren
APA
Rozzi, R., & Schmitt, S. Y. (2026). Quality Investments and Costly Adoption. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 26(1), 81-110. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2025-0113
Vancouver
Rozzi R, Schmitt SY. Quality Investments and Costly Adoption. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2026;26(1):81-110. doi:10.1515/bejte-2025-0113
BibTeX
@article{Rozzi2026,
author = {Rozzi, Roberto and Schmitt, Stefanie Y.},
title = {Quality Investments and Costly Adoption},
journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
number = {1},
pages = {81--110},
doi = {10.1515/bejte-2025-0113}
}
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