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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

A Costly Commitment: Populism, Economic Performance, and the Quality of Bureaucracy

Luca Bellodi, Massimo Morelli, Matia Vannoni

American Journal of Political Science · 2024-01 · 68 (1) · 193-209

DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12782 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Journal of Political Science, online erschienen am 02.04.2023. Verfasst von Luca Bellodi und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 61-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 63 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study the consequences of populism for economic performance and the quality of bureaucracy. When voters lose trust in representative democracy, populists strategically supply unconditional policy commitments that are easier to monitor for voters. When in power, populists try to implement their policy commitments regardless of financial constraints and expert assessment of the feasibility of their policies, worsening government economic performance and dismantling resistance from expert bureaucrats. With novel data on more than 8,000 Italian municipalities covering more than 20 years, we estimate the effect of electing a populist mayor with a close‐election regression discontinuity design. We find that the election of a populist mayor leads to smaller repayments of debts, a larger share of procurement contracts with cost overruns, higher turnover among top bureaucrats—driven by forced rather than voluntary departures—and a sharp decrease in the percentage of postgraduate bureaucrats.

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APA

Bellodi, L., Morelli, M., & Vannoni, M. (2024). A Costly Commitment: Populism, Economic Performance, and the Quality of Bureaucracy. American Journal of Political Science, 68(1), 193-209. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12782

Vancouver

Bellodi L, Morelli M, Vannoni M. A Costly Commitment: Populism, Economic Performance, and the Quality of Bureaucracy. American Journal of Political Science. 2024;68(1):193-209. doi:10.1111/ajps.12782

BibTeX
@article{Bellodi2024,
  author = {Bellodi, Luca and Morelli, Massimo and Vannoni, Matia},
  title = {A Costly Commitment: Populism, Economic Performance, and the Quality of Bureaucracy},
  journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {68},
  number = {1},
  pages = {193--209},
  doi = {10.1111/ajps.12782}
}
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