Financial Reporting Quality and Myopic Investments: Theory and Evidence
The Accounting Review · 01.10.2023 · 98 (6) · 223-251
DOI: 10.2308/tar-2021-0380 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Accounting Review, online erschienen am 27.09.2023. Verfasst von Heng Geng und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 20-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 119 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We present theory and empirical evidence that greater financial reporting quality can incentivize myopic investments. In the model, greater financial reporting quality increases investor response to earnings, elevating the manager’s incentive to invest myopically to improve earnings. Using the setting of Big N auditors’ acquisitions of non-Big Ns, which increased investor response to earnings for the acquired client firms, we find evidence supporting myopic investments. Specifically, acquired clients decrease intangible investments, particularly when (1) the increase in investor response to earnings is larger and (2) the horizon of shareholders is shorter. The investment decrease is inefficient, as evidenced by reduced profitability, fewer exploratory innovations, and other measures. JEL Classifications: G14; G34; M41; M42; O31; O34; N22.
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APA
Geng, H., Zhang, C., & Zhou, F. S. (2023). Financial Reporting Quality and Myopic Investments: Theory and Evidence. The Accounting Review, 98(6), 223-251. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0380
Vancouver
Geng H, Zhang C, Zhou FS. Financial Reporting Quality and Myopic Investments: Theory and Evidence. The Accounting Review. 2023;98(6):223-251. doi:10.2308/tar-2021-0380
BibTeX
@article{Geng2023,
author = {Geng, Heng and Zhang, Cheng and Zhou, Frank S.},
title = {Financial Reporting Quality and Myopic Investments: Theory and Evidence},
journal = {The Accounting Review},
year = {2023},
volume = {98},
number = {6},
pages = {223--251},
doi = {10.2308/tar-2021-0380}
}
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