A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Nonnegative Price Constraints
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.02.2021 · 13 (1) · 283-337
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180234 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.02.2021. Verfasst von Jay Pil Choi und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 38-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 45 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Motivated by recent antitrust cases in markets with zero-pricing, we develop a leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets. In the presence of the nonnegative price constraint, the Chicago school critique of tie-ins fails to hold. In the independent products case, tying provides a mechanism to circumvent the constraint in the tied market without inviting aggressive responses by the rival firm. In the complementary products case, the “price squeeze” mechanism cannot be used to extract surplus from the more efficient rival firm without tying. We identify conditions under which tying in two-sided markets is profitable and explore its welfare implications. (JEL D42, K21, L12, L41)
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APA
Choi, J. P., & Jeon, D. (2021). A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Nonnegative Price Constraints. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13(1), 283-337. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180234
Vancouver
Choi JP, Jeon D. A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Nonnegative Price Constraints. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2021;13(1):283-337. doi:10.1257/mic.20180234
BibTeX
@article{Choi2021,
author = {Choi, Jay Pil and Jeon, Doh-Shin},
title = {A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Nonnegative Price Constraints},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2021},
volume = {13},
number = {1},
pages = {283--337},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20180234}
}
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