Platform design biases in ad‐funded two‐sided markets
The RAND Journal of Economics · 2023-06 · 54 (2) · 240-267
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12436 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 26.04.2023. Verfasst von Jay Pil Choi und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 43-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 35 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We investigate how platform market power affects platforms' design choices in ad‐funded two‐sided markets, where platforms may find it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and extract surplus on the advertising side. We consider design choices affecting both sides in opposite ways and compare private incentives with social incentives. Platforms' design biases depend crucially on whether they can charge any price on the consumer side. We apply the framework to technology adoption, privacy, and ad load choices. Our results provide a rationale for a tougher competition policy to curb market power of ad‐funded platforms with free services.
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APA
Choi, J. P., & Jeon, D. (2023). Platform design biases in ad‐funded two‐sided markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, 54(2), 240-267. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12436
Vancouver
Choi JP, Jeon D. Platform design biases in ad‐funded two‐sided markets. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2023;54(2):240-267. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12436
BibTeX
@article{Choi2023,
author = {Choi, Jay Pil and Jeon, Doh‐Shin},
title = {Platform design biases in ad‐funded two‐sided markets},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {2023},
volume = {54},
number = {2},
pages = {240--267},
doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12436}
}
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