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On the implications of cost of anonymity in advertising financed two-sided markets

Gaurav Jakhu

Oxford Economic Papers · 01.10.2026 · 78 (4) · 1151-1171

DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpag025 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Oxford Economic Papers, online erschienen am 27.06.2026. Verfasst von Gaurav Jakhu. Die Arbeit nennt 26 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This article examines a two-sided market structure in which a monopoly platform offers a service for free to users, while generating revenue from advertisers. Users can either opt-in (share their data) or opt-out (remain anonymous) at an exogenous cost. We show that equilibrium advertising level (weakly) increases with a decrease in the cost of staying anonymous. Also, a decrease in the cost of anonymity can generate asymmetric welfare effects in markets with a small to intermediate cost of anonymity, with users becoming worse off and advertisers benefiting. Finally, platform profit increases as the cost of anonymity decreases.

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APA

Jakhu, G. (2026). On the implications of cost of anonymity in advertising financed two-sided markets. Oxford Economic Papers, 78(4), 1151-1171. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpag025

Vancouver

Jakhu G. On the implications of cost of anonymity in advertising financed two-sided markets. Oxford Economic Papers. 2026;78(4):1151-1171. doi:10.1093/oep/gpag025

BibTeX
@article{Jakhu2026,
  author = {Jakhu, Gaurav},
  title = {On the implications of cost of anonymity in advertising financed two-sided markets},
  journal = {Oxford Economic Papers},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {78},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1151--1171},
  doi = {10.1093/oep/gpag025}
}
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