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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Do You Even Lift? Strengthening Compiler Security Guarantees against Spectre Attacks

Xaver Fabian, Marco Patrignani, Marco Guarnieri, Michael Backes

Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages · 07.01.2025 · 9 (POPL) · 893-922

DOI: 10.1145/3704867 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages, online erschienen am 09.01.2025. Verfasst von Xaver Fabian und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 59 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, Italian Ministry of Education.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Mainstream compilers implement different countermeasures to prevent specific classes of speculative execution attacks. Unfortunately, these countermeasures either lack formal guarantees or come with proofs restricted to speculative semantics capturing only a subset of the speculation mechanisms supported by modern CPUs, thereby limiting their practical applicability. Ideally, these security proofs should target a speculative semantics capturing the effects of all speculation mechanisms implemented in modern CPUs. However, this is impractical and requires new secure compilation proofs to support additional speculation mechanisms. In this paper, we address this problem by proposing a novel secure compilation framework that allows lifting the security guarantees provided by Spectre countermeasures from weaker speculative semantics (ignoring some speculation mechanisms) to stronger ones (accounting for the omitted mechanisms) without requiring new secure compilation proofs. Using our lifting framework, we performed the most comprehensive security analysis of Spectre countermeasures implemented in mainstream compilers to date. Our analysis spans 9 different countermeasures against 5 classes of Spectre attacks, which we proved secure against a speculative semantics accounting for 5 different speculation mechanisms. Our analysis highlights that fence-based and retpoline-based countermeasures can be securely lifted to the strongest speculative semantics under study. In contrast, countermeasures based on speculative load hardening cannot be securely lifted to semantics supporting indirect jump speculation.

Förderung

  • Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation
  • Italian Ministry of Education

Zitieren

APA

Fabian, X., Patrignani, M., Guarnieri, M., & Backes, M. (2025). Do You Even Lift? Strengthening Compiler Security Guarantees against Spectre Attacks. Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages, 9(POPL), 893-922. https://doi.org/10.1145/3704867

Vancouver

Fabian X, Patrignani M, Guarnieri M, Backes M. Do You Even Lift? Strengthening Compiler Security Guarantees against Spectre Attacks. Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages. 2025;9(POPL):893-922. doi:10.1145/3704867

BibTeX
@article{Fabian2025,
  author = {Fabian, Xaver and Patrignani, Marco and Guarnieri, Marco and Backes, Michael},
  title = {Do You Even Lift? Strengthening Compiler Security Guarantees against Spectre Attacks},
  journal = {Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {9},
  number = {POPL},
  pages = {893--922},
  doi = {10.1145/3704867}
}
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