Enhancing SYN Cookie Security Against DDoS Attacks: Mitigating Replay Attacks with Nonce Implementation
Future Internet · 15.06.2026 · 18 (6) · 323
DOI: 10.3390/fi18060323 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Future Internet, online erschienen am 15.06.2026. Verfasst von Nazar Abbas Saqib und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 23 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: SAUDI ARAMCO Cybersecurity Chair, Imam Abdulrahman Bin Faisal University.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
SYN flooding attacks remain a persistent threat to network availability, particularly in Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) scenarios that exploit the TCP three-way handshake. Traditional SYN cookies mitigate half-open connection exhaustion but may exhibit limited replay resistance under certain adversarial conditions. This paper presents a nonce-enhanced, HMAC-SHA256-based SYN cookie mechanism designed to strengthen handshake validation while preserving stateless operation. The implemented framework binds each connection attempt to a time-bounded, per-session nonce and embeds a truncated HMAC within the TCP sequence number field. The mechanism is implemented and experimentally evaluated using a custom-built simulation framework, NOxSYN. Under concurrent SYN flood conditions, the enhanced design successfully validated legitimate handshakes while maintaining stable operation under adversarial load. Measured server-side cryptographic processing remained below 1 ms per connection, with stable CPU utilization during testing. These results demonstrate that nonce-based replay protection can be integrated into a SYN cookie framework while preserving scalability and stateless operation. The current evaluation focuses on implementation-level validation and performance characterization, providing a foundation for future security-oriented assessment across a broader range of replay-based attack scenarios.
Förderung
- SAUDI ARAMCO Cybersecurity Chair
- Imam Abdulrahman Bin Faisal University
Zitieren
APA
Saqib, N. A., Alobiad, H., Alsuliman, L., & Almulla, T. (2026). Enhancing SYN Cookie Security Against DDoS Attacks: Mitigating Replay Attacks with Nonce Implementation. Future Internet, 18(6), 323. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi18060323
Vancouver
Saqib NA, Alobiad H, Alsuliman L, Almulla T. Enhancing SYN Cookie Security Against DDoS Attacks: Mitigating Replay Attacks with Nonce Implementation. Future Internet. 2026;18(6):323. doi:10.3390/fi18060323
BibTeX
@article{Saqib2026,
author = {Saqib, Nazar Abbas and Alobiad, Haifa and Alsuliman, Layan and Almulla, Tala},
title = {Enhancing SYN Cookie Security Against DDoS Attacks: Mitigating Replay Attacks with Nonce Implementation},
journal = {Future Internet},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {6},
pages = {323},
doi = {10.3390/fi18060323}
}
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