On Power-Off Temperature Attacks Potential Against Security Sensors
Sensors · 19.03.2025 · 25 (6) · 1912
DOI: 10.3390/s25061912 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Sensors, online erschienen am 19.03.2025. Verfasst von Maryam Esmaeilian und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: LCIS, Grenoble INP, University Grenoble Alpes, 26000 Valence, France. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 29 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: ANR, French Agence Nationale de la Recherche.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Embedded systems can be targeted by fault injection attacks (FIAs), which enable attackers to alter the system specified behavior, potentially gaining access to confidential information or causing unintended outcomes, among other effects. Although numerous security sensors and attack detectors have been proposed in the literature to detect different sources of FIAs, it is crucial to ensure that these mechanisms themselves have not been tampered. Hence, the integrity of these detectors is critical in maintaining the security of embedded systems. This study focuses on evaluating the robustness of delay-based digital detectors against a new type of FIA called power-off temperature attack (POTA). POTA occurs when the chip power is turned off, rendering the detectors inactive and allowing the attackers to bypass them. After a POTA, the circuit or its detectors may not function properly when the power is restored, potentially allowing other attacks to go undetected if the detectors are less sensitive. This study implements two attack detectors on Xilinx Artix-7 FPGAs and investigates the impact of heating cycles on theses detectors’ characteristics when the FPGA is in different states, including power-off, power-on, and inactive modes (such as clock-freezing mode). Our experiments reveal that heating cycles in power-off or inactive modes can alter the FPGA component delays and reduce the accuracy of its detectors, which highlights the vulnerability of these systems to POTA and potential risks to embedded system security.
Schlagwörter
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- LCIS, Grenoble INP, University Grenoble Alpes, 26000 Valence, France.
ORCID-Profile: Maryam Esmaeilian, Vincent Beroulle, David Hély
Förderung
- ANR
- French Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Zitieren
APA
Esmaeilian, M., Beroulle, V., & Hély, D. (2025). On Power-Off Temperature Attacks Potential Against Security Sensors. Sensors, 25(6), 1912. https://doi.org/10.3390/s25061912
Vancouver
Esmaeilian M, Beroulle V, Hély D. On Power-Off Temperature Attacks Potential Against Security Sensors. Sensors. 2025;25(6):1912. doi:10.3390/s25061912
BibTeX
@article{Esmaeilian2025,
author = {Esmaeilian, Maryam and Beroulle, Vincent and Hély, David},
title = {On Power-Off Temperature Attacks Potential Against Security Sensors},
journal = {Sensors},
year = {2025},
volume = {25},
number = {6},
pages = {1912},
doi = {10.3390/s25061912}
}
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