Suárez on the Contingency of Causal Origin
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2026-05 · 112 (3) · 694-706
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70110 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, published online on 2026-04-07. Written by Han Thomas Adriaenssen. 47 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
Do individuals have their actual causal origins necessarily? Or could one and the same individual also have had a causal origin other than its actual one? Late medieval and early modern Aristotelians confront this question in the course of their discussions of the metaphysics of causation. In this paper, I discuss and evaluate Francisco Suárez's case for the view that causal origin is contingent, in the sense that the same individual that in fact proceeds from one cause could also have proceeded from some other cause of the same kind instead. I argue that his defense of this claim against his opponents is stronger, and philosophically more interesting, than appears at first. In particular, I argue that Suárez challenges the ontology of causal action presupposed by his opponents by invoking shared assumptions about truth and what we would now call truthmaking.
Cite
APA
Adriaenssen, H. T. (2026). Suárez on the Contingency of Causal Origin. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 112(3), 694-706. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70110
Vancouver
Adriaenssen HT. Suárez on the Contingency of Causal Origin. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2026;112(3):694-706. doi:10.1111/phpr.70110
BibTeX
@article{Adriaenssen2026,
author = {Adriaenssen, Han Thomas},
title = {Suárez on the Contingency of Causal Origin},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {112},
number = {3},
pages = {694--706},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.70110}
}
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