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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Leibniz on the Contingency of Free Action

Alireza Fatollahi

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie · 21.08.2026

DOI: 10.1515/agph-2025-0198 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, online erschienen am 21.08.2026. Verfasst von Alireza Fatollahi. Die Arbeit nennt 46 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In Leibniz’s mature philosophy, contingency was a necessary condition for freedom. Yet it remains a puzzle in what exact sense free acts are contingent for him. I argue that his faculty psychology holds the key to resolving this puzzle. On my interpretation, an act is contingent if it is metaphysically contingent given the considerations of the agent’s power (but not her will). I argue that there is a deep connection between the power/will distinction and a largely overlooked logical distinction at the core of Leibniz’s per se possibility theory. According to this theory, something is per se possible if it lacks an internal contradiction, even if its actualization is incompatible with God’s goodness. I argue that if this logical distinction and its connection with Leibniz’s faculty psychology are appreciated, Leibniz’s views on the contingency of free acts become far more plausible than their general reception in the literature suggests.

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APA

Fatollahi, A. (2026). Leibniz on the Contingency of Free Action. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2025-0198

Vancouver

Fatollahi A. Leibniz on the Contingency of Free Action. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. 2026. doi:10.1515/agph-2025-0198

BibTeX
@article{Fatollahi2026,
  author = {Fatollahi, Alireza},
  title = {Leibniz on the Contingency of Free Action},
  journal = {Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1515/agph-2025-0198}
}
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