Parity, moral options, and the weights of reasons
Noûs · 2023-06 · 57 (2) · 454-480
DOI: 10.1111/nous.12410 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Noûs, online erschienen am 17.04.2022. Verfasst von Chris Tucker. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 33 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. The simplest versions hold that the weight of each reason is either weightier than, less weighty than, or equal to every other reason. We'll see that this simple view leads to paradox in at least two ways. We must complicate the picture somehow. I consider two candidate complications. The first, Parity Monism, is inspired by Ruth Chang's suggestion that parity is a fourth comparative beyond the traditional three (>,
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APA
Tucker, C. (2023). Parity, moral options, and the weights of reasons. Noûs, 57(2), 454-480. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12410
Vancouver
Tucker C. Parity, moral options, and the weights of reasons. Noûs. 2023;57(2):454-480. doi:10.1111/nous.12410
BibTeX
@article{Tucker2023,
author = {Tucker, Chris},
title = {Parity, moral options, and the weights of reasons},
journal = {Noûs},
year = {2023},
volume = {57},
number = {2},
pages = {454--480},
doi = {10.1111/nous.12410}
}
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