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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Parity and the Permissivism Puzzle: A Defense of Epistemic Options

Chris Tucker, Elizabeth Jackson

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2026-07 · 113 (1) · 233-247

DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70129 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, online erschienen am 10.06.2026. Verfasst von Chris Tucker und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 90 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Moral philosophers generally affirm that there are moral options: a single person sometimes has multiple morally permissible actions at a time. But epistemologists generally deny that there are epistemic options: a single person never has multiple epistemically permissible doxastic attitudes at a time. This asymmetry is striking. Furthermore, there are intuitive cases of epistemic options. However, it's not clear how these cases differ from cases where withholding is required, such as a coin flip case. We call this the Permissivism Puzzle. In this paper, we offer a solution to the Permissivism Puzzle and defend the possibility of epistemic options by appealing to epistemic parity, which is something like imprecise equality. Not only does epistemic parity help solve the puzzle, but it also helps the permissivist respond to notable objections from, for example, arbitrariness and accuracy.

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APA

Tucker, C., & Jackson, E. (2026). Parity and the Permissivism Puzzle: A Defense of Epistemic Options. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 113(1), 233-247. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70129

Vancouver

Tucker C, Jackson E. Parity and the Permissivism Puzzle: A Defense of Epistemic Options. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2026;113(1):233-247. doi:10.1111/phpr.70129

BibTeX
@article{Tucker2026,
  author = {Tucker, Chris and Jackson, Elizabeth},
  title = {Parity and the Permissivism Puzzle: A Defense of Epistemic Options},
  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {113},
  number = {1},
  pages = {233--247},
  doi = {10.1111/phpr.70129}
}
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