Prudential Parity Objections to the Moral Error Theory
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · 01.02.2023 · 24 (1) · 102-118
DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v24i1.1922 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, online erschienen am 01.02.2023. Verfasst von François Jaquet. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 16 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
According to the moral error theory, all moral judgments are false. Until lately, most error theorists were local error theorists; they targeted moral judgments specifically and were less skeptical of other normative areas. These error theorists now face so-called “prudential parity objections,” according to which whatever evidence there is in favor of the moral error theory is also evidence for a prudential error theory. The present paper rejects three prudential parity objections: one based on the alleged irreducible normativity of prudential reasons; another on the lack of a story about the normativity of hypothetical reasons; yet another on the very nature of reasons generally. I argue that these objections leave an important variant of a local moral error theory intact.
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APA
Jaquet, F. (2023). Prudential Parity Objections to the Moral Error Theory. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 24(1), 102-118. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v24i1.1922
Vancouver
Jaquet F. Prudential Parity Objections to the Moral Error Theory. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 2023;24(1):102-118. doi:10.26556/jesp.v24i1.1922
BibTeX
@article{Jaquet2023,
author = {Jaquet, François},
title = {Prudential Parity Objections to the Moral Error Theory},
journal = {Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy},
year = {2023},
volume = {24},
number = {1},
pages = {102--118},
doi = {10.26556/jesp.v24i1.1922}
}
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