The double dividend of relative auditing—Theory and experiments on corporate tax enforcement
Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2022-12 · 24 (6) · 1433-1462
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12587 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Public Economic Theory, online erschienen am 11.04.2022. Verfasst von Ralph‐C. Bayer. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Australian Research Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, we present and extend previous theoretical results that show that tax authorities can at the same time reduce tax evasion and boost output with clever audit behavior. We argue that randomized controlled trials or field experiments are impractical for empirical testing in this context. Instead, we turn to laboratory experiments and test if humans follow the theoretical mechanisms underlying the theory. We find that both dividends, less evasion, and higher output, materialize in the laboratory. We show in additional experiments that the behavioral mechanism generating the higher output differs from the theoretical driver.
Förderung
- Australian Research Council
Zitieren
APA
Bayer, R. (2022). The double dividend of relative auditing—Theory and experiments on corporate tax enforcement. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 24(6), 1433-1462. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12587
Vancouver
Bayer R. The double dividend of relative auditing—Theory and experiments on corporate tax enforcement. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2022;24(6):1433-1462. doi:10.1111/jpet.12587
BibTeX
@article{Bayer2022,
author = {Bayer, Ralph‐C.},
title = {The double dividend of relative auditing—Theory and experiments on corporate tax enforcement},
journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
year = {2022},
volume = {24},
number = {6},
pages = {1433--1462},
doi = {10.1111/jpet.12587}
}
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