Externalities in International Tax Enforcement: Theory and Evidence
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 01.05.2023 · 15 (2) · 497-525
DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200200 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, erschienen am 01.05.2023. Verfasst von Thomas Tørsløv und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 14-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We show that the fiscal authorities of high-tax countries can lack the incentives to combat profit shifting to tax havens. Instead, they have incentives to focus their enforcement efforts on relocating profits booked by multinationals in other high-tax countries, crowding out the enforcement on transactions that shift profits to tax havens, and reducing the global tax payments of multinational companies. The predictions of our model are motivated and supported by the analysis of two new datasets: the universe of transfer price corrections conducted by the Danish tax authority, and new cross-country data on international tax enforcement. (JEL E62, F23, H25, H26, H87, K34)
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APA
Tørsløv, T., Wier, L., & Zucman, G. (2023). Externalities in International Tax Enforcement: Theory and Evidence. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 15(2), 497-525. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200200
Vancouver
Tørsløv T, Wier L, Zucman G. Externalities in International Tax Enforcement: Theory and Evidence. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 2023;15(2):497-525. doi:10.1257/pol.20200200
BibTeX
@article{Trslv2023,
author = {Tørsløv, Thomas and Wier, Ludvig and Zucman, Gabriel},
title = {Externalities in International Tax Enforcement: Theory and Evidence},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
year = {2023},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
pages = {497--525},
doi = {10.1257/pol.20200200}
}
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