Tax Enforcement Risk and Corporate Tax Avoidance : The Substitutive Roles of Corporate Governance, Political Costs, and Reputational Costs
THE KOREAN TAX ASSOCIATION · 30.09.2026 · 43 (3) · 9-51
DOI: 10.35850/kjtr.43.3.01 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift THE KOREAN TAX ASSOCIATION, online erschienen am 30.09.2026. Verfasst von Haerin Shim und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Tax audits represent a primary tax cost associated with tax avoidance and serve as an important enforcement mechanism through which tax authorities deter corporate tax avoidance. Meanwhile, strong corporate governance and high political and reputational costs may also constrain managers’ incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior, thereby reducing corporate tax avoidance. Accordingly, the monitoring role of tax authorities and firms’ internal and external governance mechanisms may operate as substitutes. This perspective is consistent with Desai et al. (2007) and Guedhami and Pittman (2008), who argue that tax enforcement can function as a substitute for corporate governance and as a form of third-party monitoring. This study empirically examines whether the deterrent effect of tax authority detection risk on corporate tax avoidance varies according to firms’ governance structures and their political and reputational costs. We find that the negative association between tax audit selection probability and corporate tax avoidance is weaker for firms with stronger governance structures and for firms facing higher political and reputational costs. Furthermore, the results differ across governance mechanisms. While board-based governance exhibits a strong substitutive relationship with tax authority monitoring, ownership-based governance mechanisms provide relatively limited empirical support. This finding indicates that the interaction between tax authority monitoring and corporate governance varies depending on the type of governance mechanism. Overall, this study provides empirical evidence on the interaction between tax authority detection risk and firm characteristics in shaping corporate tax avoidance. By demonstrating that tax enforcement, corporate governance, and non-tax costs function as partially substitutable monitoring mechanisms, this study extends the extant literature on the determinants of corporate tax avoidance and offers important policy implications for the design and implementation of efficient and flexible tax audit policies.
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APA
Shim, H., & Choi, K. (2026). Tax Enforcement Risk and Corporate Tax Avoidance : The Substitutive Roles of Corporate Governance, Political Costs, and Reputational Costs. THE KOREAN TAX ASSOCIATION, 43(3), 9-51. https://doi.org/10.35850/kjtr.43.3.01
Vancouver
Shim H, Choi K. Tax Enforcement Risk and Corporate Tax Avoidance : The Substitutive Roles of Corporate Governance, Political Costs, and Reputational Costs. THE KOREAN TAX ASSOCIATION. 2026;43(3):9-51. doi:10.35850/kjtr.43.3.01
BibTeX
@article{Shim2026,
author = {Shim, Haerin and Choi, Kiho},
title = {Tax Enforcement Risk and Corporate Tax Avoidance : The Substitutive Roles of Corporate Governance, Political Costs, and Reputational Costs},
journal = {THE KOREAN TAX ASSOCIATION},
year = {2026},
volume = {43},
number = {3},
pages = {9--51},
doi = {10.35850/kjtr.43.3.01}
}
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