EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Auctions with Endogenous Initiation

ALEXANDER S. GORBENKO, ANDREY MALENKO

The Journal of Finance · 2024-04 · 79 (2) · 1353-1403

DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13288 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 04.12.2023. Verfasst von ALEXANDER S. GORBENKO und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 13-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 49 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller‐initiated. Conversely, in private‐value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller‐ and bidder‐initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes.

Zitieren

APA

GORBENKO, A. S., & MALENKO, A. (2024). Auctions with Endogenous Initiation. The Journal of Finance, 79(2), 1353-1403. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13288

Vancouver

GORBENKO AS, MALENKO A. Auctions with Endogenous Initiation. The Journal of Finance. 2024;79(2):1353-1403. doi:10.1111/jofi.13288

BibTeX
@article{GORBENKO2024,
  author = {GORBENKO, ALEXANDER S. and MALENKO, ANDREY},
  title = {Auctions with Endogenous Initiation},
  journal = {The Journal of Finance},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {79},
  number = {2},
  pages = {1353--1403},
  doi = {10.1111/jofi.13288}
}
Kostenlos starten →