Auctions with Endogenous Initiation
The Journal of Finance · 2024-04 · 79 (2) · 1353-1403
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13288 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 04.12.2023. Verfasst von ALEXANDER S. GORBENKO und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 13-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 49 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller‐initiated. Conversely, in private‐value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller‐ and bidder‐initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes.
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APA
GORBENKO, A. S., & MALENKO, A. (2024). Auctions with Endogenous Initiation. The Journal of Finance, 79(2), 1353-1403. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13288
Vancouver
GORBENKO AS, MALENKO A. Auctions with Endogenous Initiation. The Journal of Finance. 2024;79(2):1353-1403. doi:10.1111/jofi.13288
BibTeX
@article{GORBENKO2024,
author = {GORBENKO, ALEXANDER S. and MALENKO, ANDREY},
title = {Auctions with Endogenous Initiation},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2024},
volume = {79},
number = {2},
pages = {1353--1403},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13288}
}
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