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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Experimental Auctions with Securities

Zachary Breig, Allan Hernández-Chanto, Declan Hunt

The Economic Journal · 08.06.2026

DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueag074 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 08.06.2026. Verfasst von Zachary Breig und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We experimentally implement security-bid auctions, which are used around the world to sell projects that generate large, stochastic future cash flows. Buyers make bids with debt and equity, linking payments to the project’s ex-post revenue. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, we find that debt auctions generate more revenue than equity auctions. This is explained by overbidding in debt auctions. Furthermore, we find that second-price equity auctions generate slightly more surplus than other treatments. We also implement informal auctions and find that buyers use equity more often than theory predicts, and that sellers successfully choose dominant bids.

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APA

Breig, Z., Hernández-Chanto, A., & Hunt, D. (2026). Experimental Auctions with Securities. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueag074

Vancouver

Breig Z, Hernández-Chanto A, Hunt D. Experimental Auctions with Securities. The Economic Journal. 2026. doi:10.1093/ej/ueag074

BibTeX
@article{Breig2026,
  author = {Breig, Zachary and Hernández-Chanto, Allan and Hunt, Declan},
  title = {Experimental Auctions with Securities},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/ej/ueag074}
}
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