EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Fair Diffusion Auctions

Zixin Gu, Yaoxin Ge, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · 14.03.2026 · 40 (20) · 16989-16996

DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38746 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, online erschienen am 14.03.2026. Verfasst von Zixin Gu und 3 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Diffusion auction design is a new trend in mechanism design which extends the original incentive compatibility property to include buyers' private connection report. Reporting connections is equivalent to inviting their neighbors to join the auction in practice. Then, the social welfare is collectively accumulated by all participants: reporting high valuations or inviting high-valuation neighbors. Hence, we can measure each participant's contribution by the marginal social welfare increase due to her participation. Therefore, in this paper, we introduce a new property called Shapley fairness to capture participants' social welfare contribution and use it as a benchmark to guide our auction design for a fairer utility allocation. Not surprisingly, none of the existing diffusion auctions has ever approximated the fairness, because Shapley fairness depends on each buyer's own valuation and this dependence can easily violate incentive compatibility. Thus, we combat this challenge by proposing a new diffusion auction called Permutation Diffusion Auction (PDA) for selling k homogeneous items, which is the first diffusion auction satisfying 1/(k+1)-Shapley fairness, incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Moreover, PDA can be extended to the general combinatorial auction setting where the literature did not discover meaningful diffusion auctions yet.

Zitieren

APA

Gu, Z., Ge, Y., Zhang, Y., & Zhao, D. (2026). Fair Diffusion Auctions. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 40(20), 16989-16996. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38746

Vancouver

Gu Z, Ge Y, Zhang Y, Zhao D. Fair Diffusion Auctions. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 2026;40(20):16989-16996. doi:10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38746

BibTeX
@article{Gu2026,
  author = {Gu, Zixin and Ge, Yaoxin and Zhang, Yao and Zhao, Dengji},
  title = {Fair Diffusion Auctions},
  journal = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {40},
  number = {20},
  pages = {16989--16996},
  doi = {10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38746}
}
Kostenlos starten →