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Optimization of institutional incentives for cooperation in structured populations

Shengxian Wang iD, Xiaojie Chen iD, Zhilong Xiao, Attila Szolnoki iD, Vítor V Vasconcelos iD

Journal of The Royal Society Interface · 2023-02 · 20 (199)

DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2022.0653 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of The Royal Society Interface, 2023-02. Verfasst von Shengxian Wang und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, People's Republic of China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Motivation, Punishment. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 70-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 61 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei in PubMed Central verfügbar. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The application of incentives, such as reward and punishment, is a frequently applied way for promoting cooperation among interacting individuals in structured populations. However, how to properly use the incentives is still a challenging problem for incentive-providing institutions. In particular, since the implementation of incentive is costly, to explore the optimal incentive protocol, which ensures the desired collective goal at a minimal cost, is worthy of study. In this work, we consider the positive and negative incentives for a structured population of individuals whose conflicting interactions are characterized by a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We establish an index function for quantifying the cumulative cost during the process of incentive implementation, and theoretically derive the optimal positive and negative incentive protocols for cooperation on regular networks. We find that both types of optimal incentive protocols are identical and time-invariant. Moreover, we compare the optimal rewarding and punishing schemes concerning implementation cost and provide a rigorous basis for the usage of incentives in the game-theoretical framework. We further perform computer simulations to support our theoretical results and explore their robustness for different types of population structures, including regular, random, small-world and scale-free networks.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

MotivationPunishmentHumansComputer Simulation

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

Prisoner’s Dilemma gamecooperationevolutionary game theoryinstitutional incentivesstructured populations

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, People's Republic of China.
  • Faculty of Science and Engineering, University of Groningen, Groningen 9747 AG, The Netherlands.
  • School of Computer Science and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510006, People's Republic of China.
  • Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, P.O. Box 49, Budapest 1525, Hungary.
  • Computational Science Lab, Informatics Institute, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam 1098XH, The Netherlands.
  • Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam 1012 GC, The Netherlands.

ORCID-Profile: Shengxian Wang, Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki, Vítor V Vasconcelos

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Wang, S., Chen, X., Xiao, Z., Szolnoki, A., & Vasconcelos, V. V. (2023). Optimization of institutional incentives for cooperation in structured populations. Journal of The Royal Society Interface, 20(199). https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2022.0653

Vancouver

Wang S, Chen X, Xiao Z, Szolnoki A, Vasconcelos VV. Optimization of institutional incentives for cooperation in structured populations. Journal of The Royal Society Interface. 2023;20(199). doi:10.1098/rsif.2022.0653

BibTeX
@article{Wang2023,
  author = {Wang, Shengxian and Chen, Xiaojie and Xiao, Zhilong and Szolnoki, Attila and Vasconcelos, Vítor V},
  title = {Optimization of institutional incentives for cooperation in structured populations},
  journal = {Journal of The Royal Society Interface},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {20},
  number = {199},
  doi = {10.1098/rsif.2022.0653}
}
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